Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 358–379 | Cite as

Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism

  • Akira MaedaEmail author
Original Article


This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market.


Tradable permits Marketable permits Cap-and-trade systems Uncertainty Price cap 

JEL Classification

Q58 D23 H11 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of Arts and SciencesThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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