Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp 67–85 | Cite as

Worksharing, access and bypass: the structure of prices in the postal sector

  • E. Billette de Villemeur
  • Helmuth Cremer
  • Bernard Roy
  • Joëlle Toledano
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
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Abstract

This paper studies a liberalized postal market where entrants may offer end-to-end products or concentrate on one of the segments of the network. Absent effective bypass, entry does not appear to be a serious financial threat to the incumbent, even when the products are perfect substitutes. This is no longer true when the entrant offers cheaper service in delivery. Then, the universal service provider may loose the entire pre-sorted mail market. It is left with probably low volume demand from households and from firms with high preparation cost, and its financial viability may be jeopardized.

Keywords

Postal sector Liberalization Universal service Access Bypass 

JEL Classifications

L51 L87 L32 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. Billette de Villemeur
    • 1
  • Helmuth Cremer
    • 1
  • Bernard Roy
    • 2
  • Joëlle Toledano
    • 3
  1. 1.University of Toulouse (IDEI and GREMAQ)ToulouseFrance
  2. 2.La PosteParis Cedex 15France
  3. 3.SUPELEC, Plateau du MoulonGif-sur-Yvette CedexFrance

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