Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 235–258 | Cite as

Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?*



The regulation of fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termination charges has become increasingly important in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand under the Calling Party Pays principle. In the absence of any regulation, mobile operators have an incentive to set F2M termination charges “too high”. We show that the setting of the optimal F2M termination charges depends on the significance of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. We also discuss the merits of possible remedies which are not very intrusive.

Key words

mobile telephony network externality termination charges 

JEL classification

L41 L96 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Imperial College London and CEPRTanaka Business SchoolLondonUK
  2. 2.Frontier EconomicsLondonUK

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