Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 27, Issue 2, pp 155–175



DOI: 10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8

Cite this article as:
Sappington, D.E.M. & Weisman, D.L. J Regul Econ (2005) 27: 155. doi:10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8


We analyze the incentives of a vertically-integrated producer (VIP) to engage in “self-sabotage”.Self-sabotage occurs when a VIP intentionally increases its upstream costs and/or reduces the quality of its upstream product. We identify conditions under which self-sabotage is profitable for the VIP even though it raises symmetrically the cost of the upstream product to all downstream producers and/or reduces symmetrically the quality of all downstream products. Under specified conditions, self-sabotage can enable a VIP to disadvantage downstream rivals differentially without violating parity requirements.


regulation parity sabotage 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsKansas State UniversityManhattanUSA

Personalised recommendations