Do Managerial Motives Impact Dividend Decisions in REITs?

Article

Abstract

Conflict of interest between shareholders (principal) and managers (agent) is a potential weakness of the modern corporate form. Various monitoring mechanisms—pay for performance compensation schemes, mix of cash compensation and long term compensation, the independence of the board of directors, the market for takeovers, and capital structure—have been developed to discipline management and motivate them to maximize shareholder wealth. We test the hypothesis that dividend payout levels reflect the quality of and motivation for managerial decision making and are a function of performance and monitoring effectiveness. Consistent with this hypothesis, our analyses indicate that dividend payout, and dividend yield are functions of corporate performance, board structure, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership of company shares.

Keywords

Dividend policy Performance Corporate governance Managerial entrenchment 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center of Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies (CREUES)University of ConnecticutStorrsUSA
  2. 2.Department of FinanceUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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