Review of Accounting Studies

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 72–95 | Cite as

Accounting complexity, misreporting, and the consequences of misreporting

Article

Abstract

I examine whether accounting complexity in the area of revenue recognition increases the probability of restating reported revenue. I measure revenue recognition complexity using the number of words and recognition methods from the revenue recognition disclosure in the 10-K and a factor score based on the number of words and methods. Tests reveal that revenue recognition complexity increases the probability of revenue restatements, and these restatements are the result of both intentional and unintentional misreporting. Furthermore, complexity moderates the consequences of restatement—lower incidence of AAERs, less negative restatement announcement returns, and lower subsequent CEO turnover—suggesting that stakeholders of the firm consider accounting complexity when responding to misreporting.

Keywords

Misreporting Restatement Revenue recognition Accounting complexity Restatement consequences 

JEL Classification

G38 M41 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Oregon, Lundquist College of BusinessEugeneUSA

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