Review of Accounting Studies

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 537–544 | Cite as

Discussion of: “Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness”

Article

Abstract

This paper is a discussion of Hannan et al. (Rev Account Stud, 2010), wherein subordinate-participants are endowed with private information, and superior-participants can potentially affect budget requests through their ability to reject them. Their findings are of interest to research on both the design of budgeting systems and span of control. I discuss the relevance of HRT to these literatures and comment on their implementation and experimental design. Also, I offer suggestions for future research, one of which is to explicitly introduce monitoring into experiments on span of control.

Keywords

Budgeting Experimental economics Span of control Strategy method 

JEL Classification

D82 G31 L25 M40 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Ohio State UniversityColumbusUSA

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