The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 483–491 | Cite as

An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism

  • Zachary GochenourEmail author
  • Bryan Caplan


This paper develops a critique of the single-tax proposal of Henry George. We present a simple search-theoretic model for the discovery of natural resources and show that a tax on the unimproved value of land is distortionary. We then consider the time inconsistency and regime uncertainty problem created by even incremental Georgist policy. We discuss historical cases of land reform and the subsequent challenge to re-establish a credible commitment to property rights in land and natural resources.


Henry George Search theory Property rights Natural resources 

JEL Classification

H21 Q15 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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