The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 93–105 | Cite as

Governance without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood meets positive political economy of anarchy: A review essay

  • Alexander FinkEmail author


The contributors to Governance Without a State? (Risse 2011) examine governance in areas where states are absent, too weak, or unwilling to provide “governance by government” (p. 9).1Governance as understood by the editor of the volume, Thomas Risse, stands for “institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods” (p. 9). Following the introduction by the editor, nine chapters explore various aspects of governance in situations where social cooperation does not take place in the shadow of a modern western democratic nation-state. As Risse highlights (p. 2), today and historically the modern nation-state of the western democratic variety has been the exception rather than the rule. To date, the vast majority of humans have not lived their lives in western-style democratic states. The present volume is highly relevant for social scientists who are interested in understanding social phenomena...

JEL Classification

O17 K40 



I gratefully acknowledge the support of the International Centre for Economic Research (ICER), where I wrote part of this paper. I also thank Benjamin Larin for his proofreading assistance.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of LeipzigLeipzigGermany
  2. 2.Institut für WirtschaftspolitikUniversity of LeipzigLeipzigGermany

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