The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 151–157 | Cite as

Principles and politics: Like oil and water

Article
First Online:

Abstract

In a democracy, public policies require majority support to be enacted, so politicians must enlist the support of others to further their political agendas. Successful politicians are those who can negotiate in the political marketplace to steer outcomes their way, and to succeed, politicians must be willing to set their principles aside and trade their votes away to get something better. In contrast with the principled politician whose support cannot be bought, the unprincipled politician’s support must be bought, so unprincipled politicians accumulate political IOUs that they cash in to advance their agendas. Democratic politics by design reinforces unprincipled behavior and punishes principled behavior.

Keywords

Public choice Political markets Agency theory Democracy Structure Scope Performance of government 

JEL classification

H11 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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