The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 289–292 | Cite as

Post-Hayekian socialism a la Burczak: Observations

  • J. Barkley RosserJr.Email author
  • Marina V. Rosser


Burczak (Socialism after Hayek, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006) presents a proposed form of stakeholder socialism to overcome the critique by Hayek of Marxist socialist systems. This involves financing the beginning of worker-owned and managed cooperatives through a wealth tax, with a generous social safety net, within a market economy in a democratic political system with civil liberties. While such a system may overcome worker alienation, avoid many of the informational and incentive-based inefficiencies identified by Hayek, and have some special efficiencies of its own, it will likely suffer from the financing problems most cooperatives face within predominantly market capitalist economies as they try to grow larger. The most likely location for an effort at such a system might be in a smaller country that has had some experience with workers’ management, such as the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia.


Stakeholder socialism Cooperatives Libertarian Marxism 

JEL codes

B14 P0 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.James Madison UniversityHarrisonburgUSA

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