The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 45–59

Mises’ democracy–dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique

Article

Abstract

Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’ Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.

Keywords

Democracy Dictatorship Public opinion Revolution 

JEL codes

D72 D74 D70 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Center for Study of Public Choice, and Mercatus CenterGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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