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The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 19, Issue 2–3, pp 203–215 | Cite as

Robust political economy: The case of antitrust

  • Stefan Voigt
Article

Abstract

The notion of robust political economy is applied to antitrust. It is argued that the universalizability of policy rules is crucial if both the knowledge problem and the incentive problem in antitrust are taken seriously. Policy recommendations of Williamson are compared with those of Hayek. It is further argued that the notion of universalizability is central not only with regard to antitrust but also with regard to a host of other policy areas.

Keywords

Antitrust Knowledge 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Professor of Economic Policy, Economics DepartmentUniversity of KasselKasselGermany

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