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Rust’s and Staelin’s Comments on: “A structural model of sales force compensation dynamics: estimation and field implementation” by Sanjog Misra and Harikesh Nair

  • John Rust
  • Richard Staelin
Article

I am honored to have been asked to comment on this impressive and very interesting paper. While I was unaware of this work previously, I would count this paper among the small number of confirmed “successes” of the strategy of combining structural econometric modeling and field experimentation (several others are cited by the authors, including the very nice paper by Copeland and Monnet (2009) “The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes” that investigates the effect of alternative compensation policies for workers doing check clearing at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). I would expect this paper to be highly influential not only in marketing but in economics more generally.

While much of the empirical literature in economics has become bogged down into what I regard as unproductive bickering between “structural” and “reduced form/natural experiment” camps as to which of these two approaches is “right” (as if researchers must choose one or the other of these approaches but not...

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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