Quantitative Marketing and Economics

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 5–29

Goodwill and dynamic advertising strategies

Article

Abstract

In this paper, we empirically analyze weekly advertising policies of manufacturing firms in consumer goods markets. We assume firms engage in persuasive advertising, thus policies of firms affect the goodwill of a brand. We introduce a demand and a goodwill production function. A simple transformation of the demand function allows us to identify not only the demand parameters but also the parameters of the goodwill production function. We reconstruct the unobserved goodwill levels using these parameters and past advertising levels. We restrict our attention to Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) strategies which are functions of payoff relevant state variables. Without imposing further restrictions on the dynamic competitive environment, we investigate the relationship between observed advertising strategies—which are assumed to be MPE—and payoff relevant state variables by means of several reduced form specifications. The most important determinant of advertising intensity turns out to be goodwill. We demonstrate that controlling for an advertising campaign significantly improves the explanatory power of the model.

Keywords

Advertising Goodwill Markov perfect equilibrium Dynamic oligopoly 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Information and Network Economics, Institut für StatistikLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMünchen
  2. 2.Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu KielKiel

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