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Implementation of quantum key distribution network simulation module in the network simulator NS-3

  • Miralem Mehic
  • Oliver Maurhart
  • Stefan Rass
  • Miroslav Voznak
Article

Abstract

As the research in quantum key distribution (QKD) technology grows larger and becomes more complex, the need for highly accurate and scalable simulation technologies becomes important to assess the practical feasibility and foresee difficulties in the practical implementation of theoretical achievements. Due to the specificity of the QKD link which requires optical and Internet connection between the network nodes, to deploy a complete testbed containing multiple network hosts and links to validate and verify a certain network algorithm or protocol would be very costly. Network simulators in these circumstances save vast amounts of money and time in accomplishing such a task. The simulation environment offers the creation of complex network topologies, a high degree of control and repeatable experiments, which in turn allows researchers to conduct experiments and confirm their results. In this paper, we described the design of the QKD network simulation module which was developed in the network simulator of version 3 (NS-3). The module supports simulation of the QKD network in an overlay mode or in a single TCP/IP mode. Therefore, it can be used to simulate other network technologies regardless of QKD.

Keywords

Quantum key distribution Network Simulation NS-3 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions that helped improve the quality of this paper. The research received a financial support from the SGS Grant No. SP2017/174, VSB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of TelecommunicationsVSB-Technical University of OstravaOstrava-PorubaCzech Republic
  2. 2.Digital Safety and Security DepartmentAIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbHViennaAustria
  3. 3.Universitaet Klagenfurt, Institute of Applied Informatics, System Security GroupKlagenfurtAustria

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