Forgery attack on one-time proxy signature and the improvement
This paper points out that in Wang and Wei’s scheme (Quantum Inf Process 11:455–463, 2012), an eavesdropper, Eve, can replace the original message of a proxy signature with a forged one of her choice without being detected by the verifier. Accordingly, one of the security requirements of a quantum signature, i.e., unforgeability, may not be satisfied in their scheme. An improvement is given to avoid this attack, and the comparisons with the existing quantum proxy signature are also demonstrated.
KeywordsForgery attack One-time proxy signature Decoherence-free state Quantum cryptography
We would like to thank the National Science Council of Republic of China for financial support of this research under Contract No. NSC 100-2221-E-006-152-MY3.
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