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Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition

  • Hakan Genc
  • Serkan KucuksenelEmail author
Article
  • 23 Downloads

Abstract

This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legislators make decisions in both private and public good dimensions via an endogenous recognition process. Legislators can expend resources to become the proposer and to make proposals about the allocation of private and public goods. We show that legislators exert unproductive effort to be the proposer and make proposals in both dimensions depending on legislative preferences. Effort choices in equilibrium depend mainly on preferences in both distributional and ideological dimensions as well as the patience level of legislators and the legislature’s size. We also show that in a diverse legislature it may be possible to observe distributive policies when the majority of legislators have collective-leaning preferences, or vice versa.

Keywords

Legislatures and legislative processes Majority rule Public goods 

JEL Classification

C71 C78 D72 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank the editors and reviewers for extensive comments that substantially improved the paper. All remaining errors are ours.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of BolognaBolognaItaly
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsMiddle East Technical UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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