Public Choice

, Volume 179, Issue 3–4, pp 301–313 | Cite as

A model of terrorism and counterterrorism with location choices

  • Yang Jiao
  • Zijun LuoEmail author


We study a model of terrorism and counterterrorism with three geographic target locations, in which the last location is chosen by the terrorists and is unknown to the defender. We find the choice of location and defender’s allocation of defensive resources to depend on whether the first two locations are attacked simultaneously or sequentially. In the sequential-move game, the final attack is closer to the low-valued target than it is in the simultaneous-move game. In addition, the defender chooses to defend only the location that is attacked first in the sequential game. Results from the model also can shed light on less provocative criminal events such as bank robberies and drug dealings.


Terrorism Location Defense Simultaneous Sequential 



We thank the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, which have significantly improved the qualify of the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at Jinan University, South China Normal University, and the 28th International Conference on Game Theory. We thank seminar and conference participants especially Timothy Mathews, Shane Sanders, Xianbin Wang, and Zhibo Wang for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are ours.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Finance, and AccountingFort Hays State UniversityHaysUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics and International BusinessSam Houston State UniversityHuntsvilleUSA

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