Public Choice

, Volume 175, Issue 3–4, pp 303–323 | Cite as

Shades of red and blue: government ideology and sustainable development

  • Toke S. Aidt
  • Vitor CastroEmail author
  • Rodrigo Martins


We study the effect of government ideology on sustainable development, measured as investment in genuine wealth, in a dynamic panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013. We find robust and statistically significant evidence that genuine investment grows faster under right-wing governments than under left-wing or center governments. In contrast, we find no indication of opportunistic cycles.


Sustainable development Government ideology Political cycles Genuine investment 

JEL Classification

C23 D72 I31 O15 



The authors acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions from the participants at the 23rd International Academic Conference of the International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, Venice International University, Venice, Italy, 27–30 April 2016; the participants at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal, University of Coimbra, Portugal, 1–3 July 2016; and the participants at the 2017 annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 19–22 April. Vitor Castro also wishes to thank the financial support provided by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology under the research grant SFRH/BSAB/113588/2015 (partially funded by COMPTE, QREN and FEDER).

Supplementary material

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Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 83 kb)
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Supplementary material 2 (DTA 951 kb) (5 kb)
Supplementary material 3 (DO 6 kb)


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Toke S. Aidt
    • 1
  • Vitor Castro
    • 2
    • 3
    Email author
  • Rodrigo Martins
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Faculty of Economics and Jesus CollegeUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK
  2. 2.School of Business and EconomicsLoughborough UniversityLoughborough, LeicestershireUK
  3. 3.Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)University of MinhoBragaPortugal
  4. 4.Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of CoimbraCoimbraPortugal
  5. 5.Centre for Business and Economic Research (CeBER)CoimbraPortugal

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