Advertisement

Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties?

  • Antonis AdamEmail author
  • Sofia Tsarsitalidou
Article

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the effect of US-imposed sanctions on the civil liberties of the targeted countries for the 1972–2014 period. To deal with the problem of selection and to control for the pre-sanction dynamics, we use a potential outcomes framework, which does not rely on the selection of matching variables and has the further advantage of uncovering the effect of the treatment on the outcome variable over time. What we find is that sanctions result in a decline in civil liberties, measured either by the Freedom House civil liberties index or by the Cingranelli and Richards empowerment rights index. The results are robust across various specifications.

Keywords

Sanctions Democracy Civil liberties 

JEL Classification

F51 F63 D74 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Nikos Mylonidis, Thomas Moutos, Mario Gilli, Stamatia Ftergioti, Fabio Antoniou, Mohammad Reza Farzaneganm, Paul Schaudt, participants at the 11th CESifo Workshop on Political Economy, participants at the 2nd PEDD conference, and seminar participants at the University of Ioannina and University of Patras and two anonymous referees for all their valuable comments and suggestions.

References

  1. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., & Yared, P. (2009). Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(8), 1043–1058.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2018). Democracy does cause growth. Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  3. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Adam, A., & Filippaios, F. (2007). Foreign direct investment and civil liberties: A new perspective. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4), 1038–1052.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Angrist, J. D., Jordi, O., & Kuersteiner, G. M. (2018). Semiparametric estimates of monetary policy effects: String theory revisited. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 36(3), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Angrist, J. D., & Kuersteiner, G. M. (2011). Causal effects of monetary shocks: Semiparametric conditional independence tests with a multinomial propensity score. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(3), 725–747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless ecoometrics: An empiricists companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6), S158–S183.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bjørnskov, C., & Rode, M. (2017). Regime types and regime change: A new dataset. Working Paper, Aarhus University and Universidad de Navarra.Google Scholar
  10. Brunt, P. A. (1951). The Megarian Decree. The American Journal of Philology, 72(3), 269–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Bueno De Mesquita, B., & Siverson, R. M. (1995). War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. American Political Science Review, 89(4), 841–855.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1), 67–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Choi, S.-W., & James, P. (2016). Why does the United States intervene abroad? Democracy, human rights violations, and terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(5), 899–926.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (2010). The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project. Human Rights Quarterly, 32(2), 401–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2000). The sanctions decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.Google Scholar
  16. Cox, D. G., & Drury, A. C. (2006). Democratic sanctions: Connecting the democratic peace and economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 43(6), 709–722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Daponte, B. O., & Garfield, R. (2000). The effect of economic sanctions on the mortality of Iraqi children prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. American Journal of Public Health, 90(4), 546–552.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Denizer, C., Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2013). Good countries or good projects? Macro and micro correlates of World Bank project performance. Journal of Development Economics, 105, 288–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Galtung, J. (1967). On the effects of international economic sanctions, with examples from the case of Rhodesia. World Politics, 19(3), 378–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Gastil, R. D. (1982). Freedom in the world: Political rights and civil liberties. Westport: Greenwood Press.Google Scholar
  21. Gutmann, J., Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2016). Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 229). CESifo Institute, Munich.Google Scholar
  22. Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1), 153–161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Henderson, C. W. (1998). Population pressures and political repression. Social Sciences Quarterly, 74(2), 322–333.Google Scholar
  24. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2009). Economic sanctions reconsidered. Peterson Institute for International Economics: Washington.Google Scholar
  25. Huntington, S. P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.Google Scholar
  26. Imbens, G. W., & Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Recent developments in the econometrics of program evaluation. Journal of economic literature, 47(1), 5–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Jing, C., Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (2003). Instrument choice and the effectiveness of international sanctions: A simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Peace Research, 40(5), 519–535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (1988). The theory of international economic sanctions: A public choice approach. American Economic Review, 78(4), 786–793.Google Scholar
  29. Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (1999). Unilateral versus multilateral international sanctions: A public choice perspective. International Studies Quarterly, 43(1), 37–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Kaempfer, W. H., Lowenberg, A. D., & Mertens, W. (2004). International economic sanctions against a dictator. Economics and Politics, 16(1), 29–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Kline, P. (2011). Oaxaca-Blinder as a reweighting estimator. The American Economic Review, 101(3), 532–537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Knutsen, C. H. (2015). Why democracies outgrow autocracies in the long run: Civil liberties, information flows and technological change. Kyklos, 68(3), 357–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2001). Institutions and international cooperation: An event history analysis of the effects of economic sanctions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(1), 61–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2003). The economic peace between democracies: Economic sanctions and domestic institutions. Journal of Peace Research, 40(6), 641–660.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(01), 69–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(5), 541–558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2016). The impact of US sanctions on poverty. Journal of Development Economics, 121, 110–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Nooruddin, I. (2002). Modeling selection bias in studies of sanctions efficacy. International Interactions, 28(1), 59–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Peksen, D. (2009). Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights. Journal of Peace Research, 46(1), 59–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Peksen, D., & Drury, A. C. (2009). Economic sanctions and political repression: Assessing the impact of coercive diplomacy on political freedoms. Human Rights Review, 10(3), 393–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Peksen, D., & Drury, A. C. (2010). Coercive or corrosive: The negative impact of economic sanctions on democracy. International Interactions, 36(3), 240–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Poe, S. C., Neal Tate, C., & Keith, L. C. (1999). Repression of the human right to personal integrity revisited: A global cross-national study covering the years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 291–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Services, H. H. (2001). Overview and compilation of US trade statutes. Washington: US Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
  45. Weeks, J. L. P. (2014). Dictators at war and peace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  46. Wintrobe, R. (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Wood, R. M. (2008). A hand upon the throat of the nation: Economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–2001. International Studies Quarterly, 52(3), 489–513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of IoanninaIoanninaGreece

Personalised recommendations