Public Choice

, Volume 172, Issue 1–2, pp 151–175 | Cite as

Towards secure quadratic voting

Article

Abstract

We provide an overview of some of the security issues involved in securely implementing Lalley and Weyl’s “Quadratic Voting” (Lalley and Weyl, Quadratic voting, 2016), and suggest some possible implementation architectures. Our proposals blend end-to-end verifiable voting methods with anonymous payments. We also consider new refund rules for quadratic voting, such as a “lottery” method.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Vote Scheme Polling Place Homomorphic Encryption Election Trustee 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Center for Science of Information STC (CSoI), an NSF Science and Technology Center, under grant agreement CCF-0939370. We also received support from the MACS project NSF grant CNS-1413920 and a Simons Investigator Award Agreement dated 2012-06-05.

We would also like to thank Glen Weyl for encouraging us to work on these issues, and for his helpful feedback at many points during this research.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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