Public Choice

, Volume 162, Issue 1–2, pp 159–182 | Cite as

Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights

Article

Abstract

We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.

Keywords

Endogenous property rights Credible commitment “Stationary bandit” 

JEL Classification

K11 O17 P14 

Supplementary material

11127_2014_210_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (79 kb)
Supplementary material (PDF 79 kb)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.NRU Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia
  2. 2.NRU Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia

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