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Public Choice

, Volume 157, Issue 1–2, pp 115–143 | Cite as

Honey, I shrunk the kids’ benefits—revisiting intergenerational conflict in OECD countries

  • Tim KriegerEmail author
  • Jens Ruhose
Article

Abstract

Intergenerational conflict may arise when the interests of different age groups do not align. We examine cross-country data to find evidence for this conflict in OECD countries. We derive our results from a FGLS estimation model, which is complemented by a System-GMM estimation to account for potential endogeneity. The data are from a panel of 22 OECD countries over the time period 1985–2005. We find little support for intergenerational conflict in general; however, those who are close to statutory retirement age dislike public expenditure on families and education because, once they retire, they will have less income compared to their work income. This effect is transitory, however, implying a change in voting behavior during retirement age.

Keywords

Intergenerational conflict Family benefits Population ageing Education expenditure Voting Retirement income shock Changing voting behavior of retirees 

JEL Classification

D72 H50 J13 J14 I22 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors are indebted to two anonymous reviewers and the editor, William F. Shughart II, for their excellent comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of FreiburgFreiburg i. Br.Germany
  2. 2.Ifo Institute—Leibniz-Institute for Economic ResearchUniversity of MunichMunichGermany

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