Public Choice

, Volume 158, Issue 3–4, pp 577–588 | Cite as

Institutions, information, and faction: an experimental test of Riker’s federalism thesis for political parties

Article

Keywords

William Riker Federalism Strategic voting Primaries Elections 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge the financial assistance of the National Science Foundation. We also thank, without implicating, Alexandra Cooper and the staff of SSRI for assistance in conducting the survey research. And we acknowledge the comments and suggestions Geoffrey Brennan, Amy McKay, Nicholas Miller, and David Rohde on earlier drafts. Finally, we appreciate the very helpful comments of Nikolai Hoberg, Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Sarah Necker, and Florenz Plassmann at the Public Choice World Congress in March, 2012 in Miami, Florida. Any errors or infelicities that remain are entirely the fault of the authors.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceDuke UniversityDurhamUSA
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceGeorgia State UniversityAtlantaUSA

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