Public Choice

, Volume 159, Issue 1–2, pp 197–218

Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition



The Davis-Hinich multidimensional model of electoral competition is the foundation for a very broad set of models in economics, political science, public choice and political economy. This essay reviews some of these models and how they build on and extend the original Davis-Hinich model. It also presents a new extension that makes individual preferences endogenous to the electoral process. The essay concludes with a discussion of the positive and normative implications of endogenous preferences and then returns to the basic theme of the central importance of the early Davis-Hinich papers.


Electoral competition Spatial models Endogenous preferences 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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