Public Choice

, Volume 152, Issue 1–2, pp 61–72 | Cite as

Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures

  • Michael C. MungerEmail author


Gordon Tullock made fundamental conceptual contributions to the understanding of collective choices. Tullock balanced an optimism about the capacity of political choices to facilitate gains from exchange with a pessimism about the negative externalities attending having majorities control power and dictate choices for all. Tullock’s work on both sides of this divide is surveyed, examining both the problems of voting procedures, and the promise of the demand-revealing process he helped invent, in guiding the choice of political institutions.


Voting procedures Demand-revealing process Public goods Externalities History of public choice 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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