Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures
- 249 Downloads
Gordon Tullock made fundamental conceptual contributions to the understanding of collective choices. Tullock balanced an optimism about the capacity of political choices to facilitate gains from exchange with a pessimism about the negative externalities attending having majorities control power and dictate choices for all. Tullock’s work on both sides of this divide is surveyed, examining both the problems of voting procedures, and the promise of the demand-revealing process he helped invent, in guiding the choice of political institutions.
KeywordsVoting procedures Demand-revealing process Public goods Externalities History of public choice
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Aristotle (2006/324 BC). Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Boston: NuVision Press. Google Scholar
- Arrow, K. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New Haven: Yale University Press (2nd ed., 1963). Google Scholar
- Besley, T. (2006). Principled agents: the political economy of good government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
- Buchanan, J., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy, Vol. II. In C. K. Rowley (Ed.), Selected works of Gordon Tullock. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Google Scholar
- Burke, E. (1756/1982). A vindication of natural society: or, a view of the miseries and evils arising to mankind from every species of artificial society. In F. N. Pagano (Ed.), A Letter to Lord *** by a Late Noble Writer*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Google Scholar
- Hayek, F. A. (1991). The fatal conceit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Google Scholar
- Lindahl, E. (1919). Just taxation: a positive solution (translation by E. Henderson). In R. A. Musgrave & A. T. Peacock (Eds.), Classics in the theory of public finance (pp. 168–176). London: Macmillan (1958). Google Scholar
- Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. Google Scholar
- Pigou, A. C. (1920). The economics of welfare. London: MacMillan & Co. Google Scholar
- Rousseau, J. J. (1762/2008). On the social contract, or principles of political right. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. Public domain. http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm.
- Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. New York: Little Brown. Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (1958). A general theory of politics. University of Virginia, mimeograph, privately circulated. Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (1965). The politics of bureaucracy. Washington: Public Affairs Press. Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (1976/2006). The vote motive (2nd ed.). P. Kurrild-Klitgaard (Ed). London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (1987). Autocracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (2006). Demand revealing, transfers, and rent seeking. In C. K. Rowley (Ed.), Selected works of Gordon Tullock (pp. 142–149). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Google Scholar