Public Choice

, Volume 152, Issue 1–2, pp 131–146 | Cite as

The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock

Article

Abstract

This paper surveys Gordon Tullock’s contributions to constitutional political economy. His first major contribution was his joint project with James Buchanan on liberal constitutional design. The explicitly constitutional analysis of The Calculus was followed by a series of papers and books that focused on the use of resources in conflict, including Tullock’s contributions to the anarchy and rent-seeking literatures. Tullock also pioneered the rational choice-based analysis of dictatorships and the relative merits of alternative legal systems, topics that has been neglected until fairly recently by most scholars working in the CPE tradition.

Keywords

Gordon Tullock Constitutional political economy Calculus of consent Dictatorship Rent seeking Law and economics 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWest Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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