Public Choice

, 149:133

The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents

Article

Abstract

For over 40 years researchers have attempted to test the relative efficiency of governments run by elected versus appointed officials with conflicting results. The focus of prior research has been the expenditure levels of municipal and county governments. In this paper, we consider the achievement of students in public schools. Using data from Florida’s 67 school districts, we compare academic outcomes of students in districts run by elected and appointed superintendents. To overcome selection bias, we utilize both instrumental variable methods and panel data techniques. We find no consistent differences in the performance of elected and appointed superintendents.

Keywords

Election method Efficiency 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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