Public Choice

, Volume 151, Issue 3–4, pp 695–717 | Cite as

Patriotism, taxation and international mobility

  • Salmai QariEmail author
  • Kai A. Konrad
  • Benny Geys


Patriotic citizens intrinsically prefer living in their native country compared to living in the Diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of such a “patriotic lock-in” in a world with international migration and redistributive taxation. One implication is that countries with more patriotic populations are associated with higher redistributive taxes. We then combine ISSP survey data with OECD taxation data and provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Our results provide a word of caution: the Treasury’s inherent interest in patriotic taxpayers may strengthen the political push for patriotism in an age of globalization and increased mobility.


Patriotism International mobility Taxation Redistribution Fiscal competition 

JEL Classification

H20 H73 


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public FinanceMunichGermany
  2. 2.Norwegian School of Management (BI)OsloNorway
  3. 3.Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)BerlinGermany

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