Public Choice

, Volume 150, Issue 3–4, pp 439–467

Uncertainty and ratification failure



I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into effect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary ratification failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational deficiency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse.


Game theory Bargaining Signaling games Linkage politics International cooperation Incomplete information 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Bailey, T. A. (1947). Wilson and the peacemakers: combining Woodrow Wilson and the lost peace and Woodrow Wilson and the great betrayal. New York: Macmillan. Google Scholar
  2. Banks, J. S. (2001). Signaling games in political science. Reading: Harwood Academic. Google Scholar
  3. Bayard, K., et al. (1999). New evidence on sex segregation and sex differences in wages from matched employee-employer data. NBER Working Papers 7003, National Bureau of Economic Research Inc. Google Scholar
  4. Becker, E., & Cotton, M. L. (1995). Male/female disparity in starting pay. Southern Economic Journal, 61(3), 628–643. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bölükbaşı, D. (2008). 1 Mart vakası, Irak tezkeresi ve sonrası. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap. Google Scholar
  6. Cai, H. (2000). Bargaining on behalf of a constituency. Journal of Economic Theory, 92(2), 234–273. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cameron, C. (2000). Veto bargaining: presidents and the politics of negative power. New York: Cambridge University Press. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cameron, C., & McCarty, N. (2004). Models of vetoes and veto bargaining. Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 409–435. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–1451. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Men, women, and risk aversion: experimental evidence. In Handbook of experimental economics results. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Google Scholar
  11. Evans, P. B. (1993). Building an integrative approach to international and domestic politics, reflections and projections. In P. B. Evans, R. D. Putnam, & H. K. Jacobson (Eds.), Double-edged diplomacy, international bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google Scholar
  12. Evans, P. B., Putnam, R. D., & Jacobson, H. K. (Eds.) (1993). Double-edged diplomacy, international bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google Scholar
  13. Feinberg, R. M. (1977). Risk aversion, risk, and the duration of unemployment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 59(3), 264–271. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Ganguly, C., & Ray, I. (2006). Cheap-talk: basic models and new developments. Mimeo. Google Scholar
  15. Hale, W. (2007). Turkey, the US and Iraq. SOAS Middle East Series, London. Google Scholar
  16. Heller, W. B. (2007). Divided politics: bicameralism, parties, and policy in democratic legislatures. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 245–269. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Iida, K. (1993). Analytic uncertainty and international cooperation: theory and application to international economic coordination. International Studies Quarterly, 37, 403–426. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Iida, K. (1996). Involuntary defection in two-level games. Public Choice, 89, 283–303. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Jianakoplos, N. A., & Bernasek, A. (1998). Are women more risk averse? Economic Inquiry, 36(4), 620–630. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Kapsis, J. E. (2006). The failure of US-Turkish pre-war negotiations: an over-confident United States, political mismanagement, and a conflicted military. The Middle East Review of International Affairs, 10(3). Google Scholar
  21. Kihlstrom, R. E., Roth, A. E., & Schmeidler, D. (1981). Risk aversion and solutions to Nash bargaining problem. In O. Moeschlin & D. Pallaschke (Eds.), Game theory and mathematical economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Google Scholar
  22. Lee, M. (2003). Turkey’s refusal stuns US. Agence France Presse, March 1st 2003. Google Scholar
  23. Light, A., & Ureta, M. (1995). Early-career work experience and gender wage differentials. Journal of Labor Economics, 13, 121–154. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Mango, A. (2003). Perplexed by Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 39(4), 206–228. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Matthews, S. A. (1989). Veto threats: rhetoric in a bargaining game. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 347–369. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. McCarty, N. (1997). Presidential reputation and the veto. Economics and Politics, 9(1), 1–26. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Milner, H. V., & Rosendorf, B. P. (1997a). Democratic politics and international trade negotiations: elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1), 117–146. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Milner, H. V., & Rosendorf, B. P. (1997b). A model of the two-level game. In H. V. Milner (Ed.), Interests, institutions, and information, domestic politics and international relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar
  29. Mo, J. (1994). Two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 402–422. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Mo, J. (1995). Domestic institutions and international bargaining: the role of agent veto in two-level games. American Political Science Review, 89, 914–924. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Nash, J. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18, 155–162. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Pan, P. P. Turkey rejects U.S. use of bases. Washington Post, March 2nd, 2003. Google Scholar
  33. Pissarides, C. (1974). Risk, job search, and income distribution. Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 1255–1267. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Polachek, S. W., & Kim, M.-K. (1994). Panel estimates of the gender earnings gap: individual-specific intercept and individual-specific slope models. Journal of Econometrics, 61(1), 23–42. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42, 427–460. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Reinhardt, E. (1996). Posturing parliaments: ratification, uncertainty, and international bargaining. Ph.D. diss. Columbia University. Google Scholar
  37. Robins, P. (2003). Confusion at home, confusion abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq. International Affairs, 79(3), 547–567. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Rubin, M. (2005). A comedy of errors: American-Turkish diplomacy, and the Iraq war. Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring. Google Scholar
  39. Trubek, D. M., et al.(1983). The costs of ordinary litigation. UCLA Law Review, 31, 72–127. Google Scholar
  40. Tsebelis, G., & Money, J. (1997). Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Van der Veen, M. (2009). Defending integration or integrating defense? Ratifying the EDC in Belgium and the Netherlands. Mimeo. Google Scholar
  42. Vander Lippe, J. M. (1993). The other treaty of Lausanne: the American public and official debate on Turkish-American relations. The Turkish Yearbook, 23. Google Scholar
  43. Vesterlund, L. (1997). The effects of risk aversion on job matching: can differences in risk aversion explain the wage gap. Mimeo. Google Scholar
  44. Watts, A. (1994). Bargaining through an expert attorney. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10(1), 168–186. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Worre, T. (1988). Denmark at the crossroads: the Danish referendum of 28 February 1986 on the EC reform package. Journal of Common Market Studies, 26(4), 361–388. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Yetkin, M. (2004). Tezkere, Irak krizinin gerçek öykűsű. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sabanci UniversityIstanbulTurkey

Personalised recommendations