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Public Choice

, Volume 148, Issue 3–4, pp 531–546 | Cite as

Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government

  • David Granlund
Article

Abstract

In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.

Keywords

Moral hazard Separation of powers Stackelberg Transparency Voting theory 

JEL Classification

D72 H00 H77 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUmeå UniversityUmeåSweden
  2. 2.The Swedish Retail Institute (HUI)StockholmSweden

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