Proportional versus winner-take-all electoral vote allocations
This paper considers how the welfare of voters is affected under an Electoral College system when some state elects to award electoral votes in proportion to the number of votes received by each candidate rather than awarding all electoral votes to the winner of the state. I show that a majority of voters in that state is made worse off as a result of the change. I also give conditions under which voters in other states are made better or worse off as a result of the change.
KeywordsElectoral college Proportional allocation Winner-take-all Weighted voting
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