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Public Choice

, Volume 148, Issue 1–2, pp 233–247 | Cite as

Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level

  • Sergio Naruhiko SakuraiEmail author
  • Naercio Menezes-Filho
Article

Abstract

This article tests the hypothesis of opportunistic and partisan cycle models using a new large data set of Brazilian municipalities over the 1989–2005 period. The results show an increase in total and current expenditures and a decrease in municipal investments, local tax revenues, and budget surplus in election years. They also show that partisan ideology exerts a relative influence on the performance of the local public accounts. These results confirm that both opportunistic and partisan cycles have occurred in the management of the budgets of Brazilian municipalities after the end of the military government.

Keywords

Political cycles Brazilian municipalities Panel data 

JEL Classification

C23 H72 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sergio Naruhiko Sakurai
    • 1
    Email author
  • Naercio Menezes-Filho
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of São PauloRibeirão PretoBrazil
  2. 2.Insper Institute of Educaion and ResearchUniversity of São PauloSão PauloBrazil

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