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Public Choice

, Volume 147, Issue 3–4, pp 413–420 | Cite as

A generalized Tullock contest

  • Subhasish M. ChowdhuryEmail author
  • Roman M. Sheremeta
Article

Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

Keywords

Rent-seeking Contest Spillover 

JEL Classification

C72 D72 D74 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economics, Centre for Competition Policy, and Centre for Behavioral and Experimental Social ScienceUniversity of East AngliaNorwichUK
  2. 2.Argyros School of Business and EconomicsChapman UniversityOrangeUSA

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