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Munger, M.C. Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions. Public Choice 143, 263–268 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9629-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9629-2