Public Choice

, Volume 143, Issue 3–4, pp 263–268 | Cite as

Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions

  • Michael C. MungerEmail author


Equilibrium Evolution Institutions Transactions costs 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science and Department of EconomicsDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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