Public Choice

, Volume 143, Issue 3–4, pp 327–333 | Cite as

Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the experimental study of social dilemmas

  • T. K. Ahn
  • Rick K. Wilson


Elinor Ostrom Social dilemma Experiment 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Public AdministrationKorea UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceRice UniversityHoustonUSA

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