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Public Choice

, Volume 147, Issue 1–2, pp 189–207 | Cite as

Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections

  • Yogesh Uppal
Article

Abstract

The effect of legislative turnover on the size and composition of government expenditures in Indian states over the 1980–2000 period is examined. The paper finds that excessive turnover in Indian state elections results in inefficient government expenditure policy. First, the higher the turnover, the larger the government size. Second, excessive turnover affects the allocative efficiency of government expenditures by skewing the composition of government spending toward pure consumption and away from more productive investment expenditures. Third, the effect of turnover on fiscal policy is not linear; public consumption expenditure is convex in turnover, while public investment expenditure is concave in turnover.

Keywords

Government spending Efficiency Indian elections Crowding out 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYoungstown State UniversityYoungstownUSA

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