Public Choice

, Volume 146, Issue 3–4, pp 375–394 | Cite as

Executive veto power and credit claiming

Comparing the effects of the line-item veto and the package veto
  • Indridi H. Indridason
Open Access


The line-item veto has often be heralded as an effective tool in reducing pork barrel spending. A model of veto bargaining over public goods and pork barrel spending in the presence of credit claiming incentives demonstrates that the item veto does not necessarily reduce pork barrel spending and reduces the executive’s ability to attain his preferred level of spending on public goods. The item veto also has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature while strengthening the position of the legislative agenda setter within the legislature.


Veto bargaining Package veto Line-item veto Agenda setting 

JEL Classification

C72 D72 D78 

Supplementary material

11127_2010_9595_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (322 kb)
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of California—RiversideRiversideUSA

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