Public Choice

, Volume 145, Issue 1–2, pp 223–252

Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany


DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9563-3

Cite this article as:
Braendle, T. & Stutzer, A. Public Choice (2010) 145: 223. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9563-3


This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the representation of public servants in parliaments generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. We find that a legal incompatibility of a position in the public service and a political mandate decreases and a compensation for having to hold one’s office in abeyance increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.

Political selection Parliamentary election Public servants Incompatibility 

JEL Classification

D72 D73 H11 H83 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BaselBaselSwitzerland

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