Public Choice

, Volume 142, Issue 3–4, pp 279–291 | Cite as

Do differences in presidential economic advisers matter?



Using data on members on the Council of Economic Advisors as well as US Treasury secretaries and OMB directors from 1952 through 2005, I investigate the effect of economic advisors’ educational and employment backgrounds on the time series performance of several policy variables. Ivy League advisors appear to raise non-defense government spending, although the size of the impact differs by president. While voter preferences appear to matter for a wider variety of policy variables (changes in federal regulation and marginal tax rates), the share of Ivy League advisors is at least as important as voter preferences in explaining non-defense spending.

Economic policy Presidential advisers 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Western Kentucky UniversityBowling GreenUSA

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