Public Choice

, Volume 142, Issue 3–4, pp 507–513 | Cite as

“Rubbin’ is racin''': evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR

  • Adam T. Pope
  • Robert D. Tollison


The Peltzman Effect is a well known and controversial theory in the literature. Studies have struggled to find a dataset that can accurately test for the presence of the effect. We have created a unique dataset and use a natural experiment from the sport of stock car racing to test the theory. Using race-level data from NASCAR events, we find strong evidence that a major safety regulation has led to more on-track accidents and an increased risk to both spectators and pit crew members.


Nascar Peltzman effect Moral hazard Caution laps 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas CityKansas CityUSA
  2. 2.John E. Walker Department of EconomicsClemson UniversityClemsonUSA

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