Advertisement

Public Choice

, 142:177 | Cite as

A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election

  • Norman SchofieldEmail author
  • Alexei Zakharov
Article

Abstract

In this paper we consider the nature of local Nash equilibrium (LNE) for a model of the 2007 Duma election in Russia, using estimates of valence obtained from sociodemographic variables.

We then extend this sociodemographic valence model by including institutional valences, the approval by voters of the various institutions, including the President, the Prime Minister, the State Duma and the Federation Council. We show by simulation that the vote maximizing LNE of this general stochastic model were not at the electoral origin. The dominant feature of the election was the influence of approval or disapproval of President Putin on each voter’s political choice.

Keywords

Stochastic model Election Russian Duma 

JEL Classification

H10 

References

  1. Aldrich, J. (1983). A Downsian spatial model with party activists. American Political Science Review, 77, 974–990. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. (2000). Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models. Public Choice, 103, 327–336. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J., & Rodden, J. (2006). The strength of issues: Using multiple measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting. American Political Science Review, 102, 215–232. Google Scholar
  4. Aragones, E., & Palfrey, T. (2002). Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate. Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 131–161. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Aragones, E., & Palfrey, T. (2005). Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: The effects of candidate ideology and private information. In D. Austen-Smith & J. Duggan (Eds.), Social choice and strategic decisions. Heidelberg: Springer. Google Scholar
  6. Basinger, S. J., & Hartman, T. (2006). Candidate perception in a presidential election. Unpublished manuscript: Stony Brook University. Google Scholar
  7. Bawn, K., & Rosenbluth, F. (2005). Short versus long coalitions: Electoral accountability and the size of the public sector. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 251–265. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge. Google Scholar
  9. Brader, T. A., & Tucker, J. A. (2001). The emergence of mass partisanship in Russia, 1993–1996. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 69–83. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., & Bara, J. (Eds.). (2001). Mapping policy preferences-estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  11. Budge, I., Robertson, D., & Hearl, D. (Eds.). (1987). Ideology, strategy and party change: A spatial analysis of post-war election programmes in nineteen democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  12. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M., & Whiteley, P. (2005). Political choice in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  13. Clarke, H. D., Kornberg, A., & Scotto, T. (2009a). Making political choices. Toronto: Toronto University Press. Google Scholar
  14. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M., & Whiteley, P. (2009b). Performance politics and the British voter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  15. Colton, T. J., & Hale, H. H. (2008). The Putin vote: The demand side of hybrid regime politics. Typescript: Harvard University. Google Scholar
  16. Condorcet, N. (1785). Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendus a la pluralite des voix. Paris: Imprimerie Royale. Google Scholar
  17. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Google Scholar
  18. Fidrmuk, J. (2000a). Economics of voting in post-communist countries. Electoral Studies, 19, 199–217. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Fidrmuk, J. (2000b). Political support for reforms: Economics of voting in transition countries. European Economic Review, 44, 1491–1513. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Groseclose, T. (2001). A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 862–886. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Hesli, V., & Bashkirova, E. (2001). The impact of time and economic circumstances on popular evaluations of Russia’s president. International Political Science Review, 22, 379–389. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Kass, R., & Raftery, A. (1995). Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90, 773–795. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Ladha, K. (1992). Condorcet’s jury theorem, free speech and correlated votes. American Journal of Political Science, 36, 617–674. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Ladha, K. (1993). Condorcet’s jury theorem in the light of de Finetti’s theorem: Majority rule with correlated votes. Social Choice and Welfare, 10, 69–86. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Madison, J. (1787). The federalist No. 10. In Rakove, J. (Ed.), James Madison: Writings. New York: The Library of America. Google Scholar
  26. McLennan, A. (1998). Consequences of the Condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational agents. American Political Science Review, 92, 413–418. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Miller, G., & Schofield, N. (2003). Activists and partisan realignment in the U.S. American Political Science Review, 97, 245–260. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Miller, G., & Schofield, N. (2008). The transformation of the Republican and Democratic coalitions in the U.S. Perspectives on Politics, 6, 433–450. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2007). Generation, age, and time: The dynamics of political learning during Russia’s transformation. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 822–834. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Mishler, W., & Willerton, J. P. (2003). The dynamics of presidential popularity in post-communist Russia: Cultural imperative versus neo-institutional choice? Journal of Politics, 65, 111–141. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Myagkov, M., Ordeshook, P., & Shakin, D. (2005). Fraud or fairytales? Russian and Ukrainian electoral experience. Post-Soviet Affairs, 21, 91–131. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Owen, A., & Tucker, J. A. (2008). Conventional versus transitional economic voting in Poland, 1997–2005. Unpublished manuscript. Google Scholar
  33. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics. Cambridge: MIT Press. Google Scholar
  34. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effect of constitutions. Cambridge: MIT Press. Google Scholar
  35. Powers, D. V., & Cox, J. H. (1997). Echoes from the past: The relationship between satisfaction with economic reforms and voting behavior in Poland. American Political Science Review, 91, 617–633. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Quinn, K. M., Martin, A. D., & Whitford, A. B. (1998). Voter choice in multi-party democracies: A test of competing theories and models. American Journal of Political Science, 43, 1231–1247. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Richter, K. (2006). Wage arrears and economic voting in Russia. American Political Science Review, 100, 133–145. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1973). An introduction to positive political theory. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs. Google Scholar
  39. Schofield, N. (2006a). Architects of political change: Constitutional quandaries and social choice theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  40. Schofield, N. (2006b). Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model with party activists. The Review of Economic Design, 10, 183–203. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Schofield, N. (2007). The mean voter theorem: Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium. The Review of Economic Studies, 74, 965–980. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Schofield, N., & Miller, G. (2007). Elections and activist coalitions in the U.S. The American Journal of Political Science, 51, 518–531. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Schofield, N., Miller, G., & Martin, A. (2003). Critical elections and political realignments in the U.S.: 1860–2000. Political Studies, 51, 217–240. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Schofield, N., & Sened, I. (2005). Multiparty competition in Israel: 1988–1996. The British Journal of Political Science, 36, 635–663. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Schofield, N., & Sened, I. (2006). Multiparty democracy: Elections and legislative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  46. Stokes, D. (1963). Spatial models and party competition. American Political Science Review, 57, 368–377. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Stokes, D. (1992). Valence politics. In Kavanagh, D. (Ed.), Electoral politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Google Scholar
  48. Treisman, D., & Gimpelson, V. (2001). Political business cycles and Russian Elections: or the manipulation of “Chudar”. British Journal of Political Science, 31, 225–246. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Wergen, S. K., & Konitzer, A. (2006). The 2003 Russian Duma election and the decline in rural support for the communist party. Electoral Studies, 25, 677–695. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. White, S., Oates, S., & MacAllister, I. (2005). Media effects and Russian Elections, 1999–2000. British Journal of Political Science, 35, 191–208. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Zakharov, A. (2009). A model of candidate location with endogenous valence. Public Choice, 138, 347–366. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Zakharov, A. V., & Fantazzini, D. (2008). Idiosyncratic issue salience in probabilistic voting models: The cases of Netherlands, UK, and Israel. Unpublished manuscript: Moscow School of Economics. Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center in Political EconomyWashington University in Saint LouisSaint LouisUSA
  2. 2.Department of Higher Mathematics at the Economics FacultyHigher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia

Personalised recommendations