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Public Choice

, Volume 140, Issue 3–4, pp 287–317 | Cite as

On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009

  • Roger D. Congleton
Editorial Commentary

Abstract

U.S. policies to promote home ownership and other banking regulatory decisions helped to create a highly leveraged international market for mortgage-based securities. Declines in the price of housing, consequently, had major effects on the balance sheets and portfolios of financial institutions throughout the world.

The political response to the financial crisis has been rapid and large. In general, differences in the effectiveness of government policies show the advantage of standing institutions at crisis management relative to innovative legislation.

Keywords

Political economy Crisis management Regulatory failure Financial markets Housing markets Credit markets Asset bubbles Public choice 

JEL Classification

D72 D73 D8 K2 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Study of Public ChoiceGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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