Public Choice

, 142:9 | Cite as

Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good

Article
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjects’ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large.

Keywords

Voluntary coalitions Voluntary agreements Public goods experiments Free riding 

JEL Classification

H41 C92 C72 Q50 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Supplementary material

11127_2009_9468_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (44 kb)
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. (PDF 45 kB)
11127_2009_9468_MOESM2_ESM.pdf (45 kb)
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. (PDF 46 kB)

References

  1. Andreoni, J., & Croson, R. (2008). Partners versus strangers: random rematching in public goods experiments. In C. R. Plott & V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics results (Vol. 1). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Google Scholar
  2. Asch, P., Giglitotti, G. A., & Polito, J. A. (1993). Free riding with discrete and continuous public goods: some experimental evidence. Public Choice, 77, 293–305. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bagnoli, M., & McKee, M. (1991). Voluntary contributions games: efficient private provision of public goods. Economic Inquiry, 29, 351–366. Google Scholar
  4. Barrett, S. (1994). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 46(5), 878–894. Google Scholar
  5. Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty-making. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  6. Cadsby, C. B., & Maynes, E. (1999). Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence. Journal of Public Economics, 71(1), 53–73. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cadsby, C. B., Croson, R., Marks, M., & Maynes, E. (2008). Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: an adversarial collaboration. Public Choice, 135(3), 277–289. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cason, T. N., Saijo, T., Yamato, T., & Yokotani, K. (2004). Non-excludable public goods experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 49(1), 81–102. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Coats, J. C., & Neilson, W. S. (2005). Beliefs about other-regarding preferences in a sequential public goods game. Economic Inquiry, 43(3), 614–622. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Cooper, D. J., & Stockman, C. K. (2002). Learning to punish: experimental evidence from a sequential step-level public goods game. Experimental Economics, 5(1), 39–51. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. D’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Weymark, J. A. (1983). On the stability of collusive price leadership. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 16(1), 17–25. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., Simmons, R. T., & Van De Kragt, A.J.C. (1986). Organizing groups for collective action. The American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1171–1185. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Dorsey, R. E. (1992). The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions. Public Choice, 73(3), 261–282. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Erev, I., & Rapoport, A. (1990). Provision of step-level public goods: the sequential contribution mechanism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34(3), 401–425. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Fischbacher, U., Gachter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3), 397–404. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004). Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: testing “conditional cooperation” in a field experiment. The American Economic Review, 94(5), 1717–1722. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Goren, H., Kurzban, R., & Rapoport, A. (2003). Social loafing versus social enhancement: public goods provisioning in real-time with irrevocable commitments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 90(2), 277–290. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Goren, H., Rapoport, A., & Kurzban, R. (2004). Revocable commitments to public goods provision under the real-time protocol of play. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17(1), 17–37. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Isaac, M. R., Schmidtz, D., & Walker, J. M. (1989). The assurance problem in a laboratory market. Public Choice, 62(3), 217–236. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Kolstad, C. (2007). Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 53(1), 68–79. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Kurzban, R., McCabe, K., Smith, V. L., & Wilson, B. J. (2001). Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real-time public goods game. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(12), 1662–1673. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Marks, M., & Croson, R. (1998). Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a threshold public good: an experimental investigation. Journal of Public Economics, 67(2), 195–220. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Morgenstern, R. D., & Pizer, W. A. (2007). Reality check: the nature and performance of voluntary environmental programs in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Washington: Resources for the Future Press. Google Scholar
  24. Rapoport, A., & Eshed-Levy, D. (1989). Provision of step-level public goods: effects of greed and fear of being gypped. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44(3), 325–344. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Rapoport, A., & Suleiman, R. (1993). Incremental contribution in step-level public goods games with asymmetric players. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55(2), 171–194. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Rondeau, D., Schulze, W. D., & Poe, G. L. (1999). Voluntary revelation of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism. Journal of Public Economics, 72(3), 455–470. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Suleiman, R., & Rapoport, A. (1992). Provision of step-level public goods with continuous contribution. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5(2), 133–153. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Swanson, T., & Johnston, S. (1999). Global environmental problems and international environmental agreements: the economics of international institution building. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Google Scholar
  29. Ulph, A. (2004). Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 29(1), 53–73. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998). Kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change. Google Scholar
  31. Van De Kragt, A. J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1983). The minimal contributing set as a solution to public goods problems. The American Political Science Review, 77(1), 112–122. CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Economics DepartmentAppalachian State UniversityBooneUSA

Personalised recommendations