Buying supermajorities in a stochastic environment
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This paper considers a model in which two opposing lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators, but the precise preferences of the legislators are not known. I show that, in contrast to the normally predicted effect of uncertainty on the formation of supermajorities, in the presence of competing lobbyists, increased risk that members of a lobbyist’s coalition will not vote for the proposal may decrease the number of legislators a lobbyist includes in her coalition.
KeywordsLobbying Supermajorities Uncertainty
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