Public Choice

, 141:351 | Cite as

Buying supermajorities in a stochastic environment

  • Patrick HummelEmail author


This paper considers a model in which two opposing lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators, but the precise preferences of the legislators are not known. I show that, in contrast to the normally predicted effect of uncertainty on the formation of supermajorities, in the presence of competing lobbyists, increased risk that members of a lobbyist’s coalition will not vote for the proposal may decrease the number of legislators a lobbyist includes in her coalition.


Lobbying Supermajorities Uncertainty 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of BusinessStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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