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Public Choice

, Volume 141, Issue 1–2, pp 189–212 | Cite as

Governance choice on a serial network

  • Feng Xie
  • David Levinson
Article

Abstract

This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.

Keywords

Governance choice Transportation Infrastructure Fiscal federalism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Silver SpringUSA
  2. 2.University of MinnesotaMinneapolisUSA

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