Public Choice

, Volume 140, Issue 3–4, pp 421–429 | Cite as

A principal-agent approach to a self-administered organization with an elected principal



We consider a self-administered organization characterized by a principal elected by the agents of the organization. Conditions are established under which self-administration leads to either stronger or weaker incentives in comparison to an organization which only pursues exogenous objectives. While the output of the organization is controlled by the effort of the agents and by nature, the pay-off of the principal also includes rents from office. Generally, two different contractual regimes can be observed: either a hard regime with strong incentives and low fixed payments, or a soft regime with weak incentives and high fixed payments.


Self-administration Public organization Moral hazard Probabilistic voting 

JEL Classification

D23 D73 H41 L32 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Erlangen-NurembergNurembergGermany
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsKarlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany

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