Public Choice

, 140:379 | Cite as

Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition

  • Johannes BeckerEmail author
  • Andreas Peichl
  • Johannes Rincke


This paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians’ outside earnings. In our framework, politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings. The main hypothesis is that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition. We test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the German federal assembly and find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings.


Political competition Outside earnings Political rents 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Johannes Becker
    • 1
    Email author
  • Andreas Peichl
    • 2
  • Johannes Rincke
    • 3
  1. 1.Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Saïd Business SchoolUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.IZA—Institute for the Study of LaborBonnGermany
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MunichMunichGermany

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