Public Choice

, Volume 140, Issue 1–2, pp 85–104 | Cite as

A basic tool set for a generalized directional model

  • Eric LinhartEmail author
  • Susumu Shikano


In political science, there are two classes of spatial models: those which are based on a distance logic and those which are based on a directional logic. This distinction can be found in terms of diverse topics, as voting theory, coalition theory or legislative politics. While Tsebelis (Br. J. Political Sci. 25:289–325, 1995) among others discussed implications of distance models, the respective counterparts for directional models have not been explicitly derived in the existing literature. We try to close this gap by discussing discrepancies between both kinds of models and derive some of the most relevant tools for analyses based on directional models.


Spatial model Proximity models Directional models 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kiel UniversityKielGermany
  2. 2.Konstanz UniversityKonstanzGermany

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